In the recent Kloha-Montgomery Debate, John Warwick
Montgomery described thoroughgoing eclecticism as incompatible with the
doctrine of Biblical inerrancy. What is
thoroughgoing eclecticism? Jeff Kloha, quoting J. Keith Elliott, described it as “the method that allows
internal considerations for a reading’s originality to be given priority over
documentary considerations.” An
illustrative example of thoroughgoing eclecticism in practice can be found in
Kloha’s essay, “Elizabeth ’s Magnificat,” in the 2014 volume, Texts & Traditions: Essays in Honour of J. Keith Elliott (beginning
on page 200).
In that essay, Kloha offers a cumulative case for the theory
that the original text of Luke 1:46 had
neither the name “Mary” nor “Elizabeth ”
but only “And said” (Και ειπεν). This
would imply, as I mentioned in the previous post, that (1) all the known Greek manuscripts of Luke contain a scribal
corruption at this point, and (2) it
was Elizabeth, rather than Mary, who spoke the Magnificat.
A page from Codex Vercellensis (late 300s) |
A little-known contemporary of Jerome named Nicetas of
Remesiana (335-414), who read both Latin and Greek, and who was known for his
hymn-writing, attributed the Magnificat to Elizabeth .
(1) he decides that in this case, an older witness should be given less weight than a younger witness,
(2) he decides that a
non-Greek witness should be given less weight than a Greek witness, and
(3) he decides that
patristic evidence is less important than manuscript evidence.
Via all three points, Montgomery employs internal evidence
as the means by which to gauge the relative weight of the components of
external evidence – that is, Montgomery is resorting to a consideration of
internal factors even though he proposed that one should “only use the
internal considerations where they’re absolutely necessary.” Why
should the second-century composition of a Greek-writer such as Irenaeus, be
given less weight than two manuscripts produced 150 years later? Why
should Latin evidence be minimized, unless one can show that it was derived
from some non-Greek source or was the result of mistranslation? Why
think that a Latin translator detoured from the meaning of his Greek text? Why
assume that the manuscripts used by a patristic writer in the late 300s
(Nicetas) would be less accurate than Vaticanus and Sinaiticus? Why
should manuscripts known to Jerome be considered lightweight?
Perhaps there are sound answers to all these questions – but to downplay
them because they imply that “the Greek texts” contain a scribal corruption is
to pretend as if our present
situation (in which all the Greek manuscripts affirm that Mary spoke the
Magnificat) is the same as the situation in the 300s and 400s. However, the external evidence indicates that
if we were to situate our perspective in the fourth century, we could not so
easily settle the question via a cavalier appeal to “the Greek texts” because
the Greek manuscripts at that time did not all agree in Luke 1:46. We can either ignore this external evidence
(as if disagreement with the Nestle-Aland compilation is a sufficient reason to
consider a reading incorrect), or else we can analyze it and evaluate its
possible implications.
One would think that Dr. Montgomery, having recommended that
textual critics should “only use the internal considerations where they’re
absolutely necessary,” would far prefer the conservative approach in which a
textual critic may express some conjectural emendations, but does not put them in
the printed text, instead deferring to the extant Greek manuscript evidence. But no.
When observing that Kloha did not insist on advancing his theory about
Luke 1:46 as more than a detailed
suggestion, however plausible, Montgomery stated, “I find it absolutely
disingenuous when you will not follow through on what you wrote in your own
article. If you believed in that article
that the better reading, the better text, for the Magnificat, was Elizabeth ,
you have no business in the world just ignoring the problem now.”
Suppose, however, that Dr. Kloha, or any textual critic,
resolved to turn the Sunday School lesson-hour into a lecture about every
textual variant-unit that he considered worth re-examining. When would the actual lessons ever be
taught? Sunday-school lessons are
Sunday-school lessons, and instructors who are aware of many textual issues
routinely ignore them, to avoid needlessly throwing their students into the deep end, so to speak. It is simply more efficient to reserve textual issues to venues specifically focused upon
them, unless a specific question is raised.
Yet the Dr. Montgomery who called Dr. Kloha’s approach inconsistent with Biblical inerrancy is the same person who said that the variants between NA28 and the Textus Receptus are “not materially
different from what you’re reading today.”
I remind the reader that those differences consist of over 1,000
translatable points, including the inclusion or exclusion of whole verses, in
the Gospels alone. Does it seen even-handed to observe
a change in the printed text from “shall
be burned up” to “shall not be found”
in Second Peter 3:10, and a change from “Lord”
to “Jesus” in Jude verse 5, and a
change from “name” to “cause” in First Peter 4:16 (to give
just three examples) and say that these differences in the text are “not
materially different,” but when Dr. Kloha makes a suggestion about one word, he has done
something “on the periphery,” something different than what the compilers of
NA28 have done?
One of Dr. Montgomery's slides. |
(I have to agree that Dr. Kloha has indeed done something
different: he has suggested that a
reading without Greek manuscript-support is original, while the compilers
of NA28 have not merely suggested such a reading; they have inserted such a reading into the text! Yet Dr. Montgomery looks at Dr. Kloha’s
suggestion and concludes that his approach is too subjective and has the consequence of rendering Biblical inerrancy
impossible, and then he looks at the work of the compilers at Muenster and says
that they seem to be moving toward a more objective approach, “and this is all
to the good.” ?!?!)
It seems to me that nothing that Dr. Kloha wrote in his essay, or expressed at the debate, poses a problem for the
doctrine of Biblical inerrancy. I am not persuaded by his meticulously researched suggestion that there was no
proper name in the original text of Luke 1:46, but if someone were persuaded by it, that person would not be obligated to declare Luke to be in error; it would only follow that copyists made a mistake.
There is, it seems, only one subject of the debate yet to
address: the question of the “plasticity”
of the New Testament text. God willing,
that will be the subject of my next post.
3 comments:
"Theodore Beza, similarly, was convinced that in Revelation 16:5, the original text referred to the “One who is, and who was, and shall be,” even though the final phrase is not found in Revelation 16:5 in any Greek manuscript (although it recurs elsewhere in Revelation, such as in 1:8)"
Actually, the word Beza conjectured is an hapax legomenon in the NT; what is found repeatedly in Revelation is a similar phrase, "the one who is, and was, and is to come."
No one has adequately explained why the formula should be conjectured in such a unique manner.
I don’t suppose many of websites give this kind of information.
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Theodore Beza wasn't the only one who apparently thought there was a Nomen Sacrum expansion at Revelation 16:5. Elias Hutter, in his Nuremberg Polyglot in 1599, expanded it into an equivalent of the other verses in Rev. 1:8, etc. (which is not exactly the same as Beza, however, who has a hapax legomenon). And the Elzevirs' 1633 TR concurred with Beza, thus differing from their earlier 1624 edition in this place, leading me to think there was a concrete reason for doing so. The most straightforward explanation I can think of for this is this is just a Nomen Sacrum expansion.
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